Privacy, Control, and Talk of Rights

Social Philosophy and Policy 17 (02):45- (2000)
An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do
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DOI 10.1017/S0265052500002107
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Tony Doyle (2009). Privacy and Perfect Voyeurism. Ethics and Information Technology 11 (3):181-189.

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