Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science

Theoria 28 (1):61-75 (2013)
Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which people exhibit instrumental rationality. Popper points out that people also exhibit critical rationality, the tendency to stand back from, and to question or criticise, their views. I explain how our critical rationality impugns the explanatory value of the rationality principle and thereby threatens the very possibility of social science. I discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality with the possibility of social science if we invoke Popper’s conception of limited rationality and his indeterminism.
Keywords human action  explanation  indeterminism  Popper  rationality  rationality principle  situational logic  social science
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DOI 10.1387/theoria.1879
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Danny Frederick (2013). Free Will and Probability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.

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