David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):1-22 (2007)
It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call ‘social models’. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals’ roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Shannon Spaulding (2012). Mirror Neurons Are Not Evidence for the Simulation Theory. Synthese 189 (3):515-534.
Vivian Bohl (2015). We Read Minds to Shape Relationships. Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):674-694.
Kristin Andrews (2015). The Folk Psychological Spiral: Explanation, Regulation, and Language. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53:50-67.
Marc Slors (2012). The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory. Inquiry 55 (5):521-542.
Similar books and articles
G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.
Dennis Krebs (2000). On Levels of Analysis and Theoretical Integration: Models of Social Behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):260-261.
William J. Clancey (1993). The Knowledge Level Reinterpreted: Modeling Socio-Technical Systems. In [Book Chapter].
Marthe Chandler (1988). Models of Voting Behavior in Survey Research. Synthese 76 (1):25 - 48.
Heidi Lene Maibom (2003). The Mindreader and the Scientist. Mind and Language 18 (3):296-315.
Elliot Turiel (1983). The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention. Cambridge University Press.
Richard E. Petty (2004). Multi-Process Models in Social Psychology Provide a More Balanced View of Social Thought and Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):353-354.
Heidi L. Maibom (2007). Social Systems. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):557 – 578.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads17 ( #157,319 of 1,725,833 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #110,118 of 1,725,833 )
How can I increase my downloads?