Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):228-248 (2008)
|Abstract||My aim is to show that theories which try to construct truthmakers out of objects and properties/relations alone are not tenable: The Frege–Wittgenstein idea of incompleteness does not yield truthmakers. Armstrong’s theory of partial identity and the theory of moments, i.e., of non-transferable properties, yield truthmakers, but these theories have counter-intuitive consequences. I conclude that the notion of a truthmaker makes ontological demands beyond objects and properties/relations and propose that truthmakers are exemplification relations which are necessarily tied to objects and properties/relations.|
|Keywords||truthmakers facts Bradley's regress|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ross Paul Cameron (2008). Truthmakers and Modality. Synthese 164 (2):261 - 280.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmakers. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
Jamin Asay (2011). Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Ross Paul Cameron (2008). Truthmakers and Necessary Connections. Synthese 161 (1):27-45.
Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
David Liggins (2005). Truthmakers and Explanation. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon.
Philipp Keller (2007). A World of Truthmakers. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag.
Denis Robinson (2002). Identities, Distinctnesses, Truthmakers, and Indiscernibility Principles. Logique Et Analyse 169:145-183.
Added to index2009-11-23
Total downloads4 ( #188,906 of 722,874 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,874 )
How can I increase my downloads?