Truthmakers (are indexed combinations)

Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):228-248 (2008)
My aim is to show that theories which try to construct truthmakers out of objects and properties/relations alone are not tenable: The Frege–Wittgenstein idea of incompleteness does not yield truthmakers. Armstrong’s theory of partial identity and the theory of moments, i.e., of non-transferable properties, yield truthmakers, but these theories have counter-intuitive consequences. I conclude that the notion of a truthmaker makes ontological demands beyond objects and properties/relations and propose that truthmakers are exemplification relations which are necessarily tied to objects and properties/relations.
Keywords truthmakers  facts  Bradley's regress
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.06
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

6 ( #322,007 of 1,725,159 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #349,161 of 1,725,159 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.