David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):228-248 (2008)
My aim is to show that theories which try to construct truthmakers out of objects and properties/relations alone are not tenable: The Frege–Wittgenstein idea of incompleteness does not yield truthmakers. Armstrong’s theory of partial identity and the theory of moments, i.e., of non-transferable properties, yield truthmakers, but these theories have counter-intuitive consequences. I conclude that the notion of a truthmaker makes ontological demands beyond objects and properties/relations and propose that truthmakers are exemplification relations which are necessarily tied to objects and properties/relations.
|Keywords||truthmakers facts Bradley's regress|
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