The interdependence of structure, objects and dependence

Synthese 175 (S1):89 - 109 (2010)
Abstract
According to 'Ontic Structural Realism' (OSR), physical objects—qua metaphysical entities—should be reconceptualised, or, more strongly, eliminated in favour of the relevant structures. In this paper I shall attempt to articulate the relationship between these putative objects and structures in terms of certain accounts of metaphysical dependence currently available. This will allow me to articulate the differences between the different forms of OSR and to argue in favour of the 'eliminativist' version. A useful context is provided by Floridi's account of the relationship between 'ontic' and 'epistemic' structural realisms and I shall conclude with some brief remarks on possible extensions of OSR into other scientific domains
Keywords Structural realism  Information  Dependence  Eliminativism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jacob Busch (2003). What Structures Could Not Be. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3):211 – 225.

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