David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Frontiers 5 (1):21-30 (2010)
In opposition to the tenet of contemporary action theory that an intentional action must be done for a reason, I argue that some intentional actions are unmotivated. I provide examples of arbitrary and habitual actions that are done for no reason at all. I consider and rebut an objection to the examples of unmotivated habitual action. I explain how my contention differs from recent challenges to the tenet by Hursthouse, Stocker and Pollard.
|Keywords||arbitrary action desire habitual action intentional action reason value Hursthouse Stocker Pollard Michael Smith|
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Danny Frederick (2013). A Puzzle About Natural Laws and the Existence of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):269-283.
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