Why the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is not contingently true either

Synthese 78 (2):141 - 166 (1989)
Faced with strong arguments to the effect that Leibniz''sPrinciple of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is not a necessary truth, many supporters of the Principle have staged a strategic retreat to the claim that it is contingently true in this, the actual, world. The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of the various forms of PII in both classical and quantum physics, and it is concluded that this latter view is at best doubtful, at worst, simply wrong.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,230
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 26 references

Citations of this work BETA
Christina Conroy (2012). The Relative Facts Interpretation and Everett's Note Added in Proof. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 43 (2):112-120.
F. A. Muller & Simon Saunders (2008). Discerning Fermions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):499-548.
S. Perovic (2008). Essay Review. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 39 (3):694-699.

View all 6 citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

68 ( #33,289 of 1,699,588 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #161,079 of 1,699,588 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.