A theory of strong indiscernibles
| Abstract | The Complete Theory of Everything (CTE) is based on certain axioms of indiscernibility. Such axioms of indiscernibility have been given a philosophical justification by Kit Fine. I want to report on an attempt to give strong indiscernibility axioms which might also be subject to such philosophical analysis, and which prove the consistency of set theory; i.e., ZFC or more. In this way, we might obtain a (new kind of) philosophical consistency proof for mathematics. | |||||||||
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