|Abstract||I want to look at recent developments of representing AGM-style belief revision in dynamic epistemic logics and the options for doing something similar for ranking theory. Formally, my aim will be modest: I will define a version of basic dynamic doxastic logic using ranking functions as the semantics. I will show why formalizing ranking theory this way is useful for the ranking theorist first by showing how it enables one to compare ranking theory more easily with other approaches to belief revision. I will then use the logic to state an argument for defining ranking functions on larger sets of ordinals than is customary. Secondly, I will argue that the only way to extend the account of belief revision given by ranking theory to higher-order beliefs and revisions is by continuing the approach taken by me and defining ranking theoretical equivalents of dynamic epistemic logics. For proponents of dynamic epistemic logic, such logics will naturally be of interest provided they are convinced of the revision operator defined by ranking theory.|
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