David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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PREFACE. We present a variety of basic theories involving fundamental concepts of naive thinking, of the sort that were common in "natural philosophy" before the dawn of physical science. The most extreme forms of infinity ever formulated are embodied in the branch of mathematics known as abstract set theory, which forms the accepted foundation for all of mathematics. Each of these theories embodies the most extreme forms of infinity ever formulated, in the following sense. ZFC, and even extensions of ZFC with the so called large cardinal axioms, are mutually interpretable with these theories. This is an extended abstract. Proofs of the claims will appear elsewhere.
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