Confronting ideals of proof with the ways of proving of the research mathematician

Studia Logica 96 (2):273-288 (2010)
In this paper, we discuss the prevailing view amongst philosophers and many mathematicians concerning mathematical proof. Following Cellucci, we call the prevailing view the “axiomatic conception” of proof. The conception includes the ideas that: a proof is finite, it proceeds from axioms and it is the final word on the matter of the conclusion. This received view can be traced back to Frege, Hilbert and Gentzen, amongst others, and is prevalent in both mathematical text books and logic text books
Keywords Axiomatic proof  analytic proof  axiom  hypothesis  communication  rigor  application  context
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,395
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2000). Logical Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Hilary Putnam (1980). Models and Reality. Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):464-482.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

26 ( #154,110 of 1,911,418 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #177,396 of 1,911,418 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.