Philosophy of Science 75 (5):670-681 (2008)
|Abstract||In two recent papers Barry Loewer ( 2001 , 2004 ) has suggested to interpret probabilities in statistical mechanics as chances in David Lewis’s ( 1994 ) sense. I first give a precise formulation of this proposal, then raise two fundamental objections, and finally conclude that these can be overcome only at the price of interpreting these probabilities epistemically. †To contact the author, please write to: Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, England; e‐mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.|
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