Inconsistency in classical electrodynamics

Philosophy of Science 71 (4):525-549 (2004)
I show that the standard approach to modeling phenomena involving microscopic classical electrodynamics is mathematically inconsistent. I argue that there is no conceptually unproblematic and consistent theory covering the same phenomena to which this inconsistent theory can be thought of as an approximation; and I propose a set of conditions for the acceptability of inconsistent theories.
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Mathias Frisch (2009). 'The Most Sacred Tenet'? Causal Reasoning in Physics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):459-474.
Mathias Frisch (2013). Conceptual Problems in Classical Electrodynamics: No More Toils and Trouble? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 44 (4):527-531.

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