Necessitarianism and teleology in Aristotle's biology

Biology and Philosophy 1 (3):355-365 (1986)
In Aristotle's biological works, there is an apparent conflict between passages which seem to insist that only hypothetical necessity (anagk ex hypotheses) operates in the sublunary world, and passages in which some biological phenomena are explained as simply (hapls) necessary. Parallel to this textual problem lies the claim that explanations in terms of simple necessity render teleological explanations (in some of which Aristotle puts hypothetical necessity to use) superfluous. I argue that the textual conflict is only apparent, and that Aristotle's notion of coincidental sameness allows him to avoid the superfluity problem.
Keywords Aristotle  necessity  teleology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00127111
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,831
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Barnes (1986). The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (4):493-494.
Alan Code (1976). The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter. Philosophical Studies 29 (6):357 - 367.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

39 ( #84,059 of 1,724,748 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #81,198 of 1,724,748 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.