David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Episteme 7 (2):164-178 (2010)
In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential role in combating epistemic injustice. My response to Goldberg principally concerns my perceptual account of the epistemology of testimony, which I defend as being both well-motivated and best categorized as a species of non-inferentialism. I also explain its relation to the reductionism/non-reductionism contrast, and defend my resistance to casting it as any kind of default view. In response to Hookway, I contrast discriminatory with distributive forms of epistemic injustice, and defend the basic taxonomy I present in the book, which casts testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as the two fundamental discriminatory forms of epistemic injustice
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References found in this work BETA
C. A. J. Coady (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Elizabeth Anderson (2012). Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions. Social Epistemology 26 (2):163-173.
Jeffrey Epstein (2014). Habermas, Virtue Epistemology, and Religious Justifications in the Public Sphere. Hypatia 29 (2):422-439.
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