Suspended judgment

Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181 (2013)
Abstract   In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should be thought of as an attitude or not. In this paper I argue that suspended judgment is (or at least involves) a genuine attitude. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-17 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y Authors Jane Friedman, St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3UJ UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
Keywords Withholding Belief  Agnosticism  Doxastic Attitudes
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y
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References found in this work BETA
Ralph Wedgwood (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):267-97.
Michael Bergmann (2005). Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.

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Citations of this work BETA
Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
Conor McHugh (2013). The Illusion of Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3).
Ralph Wedgwood (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.

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