David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):151-177 (2010)
Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical (he thought it often involved a certain ‘fantasy’). I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Thomas Scanlon (2008). Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1981). Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980. Cambridge University Press.
Bernard Williams (1992). Shame and Necessity. University of California Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jules Holroyd (2015). Implicit Bias, Awareness and Imperfect Cognitions. Consciousness and Cognition 33:511-523.
Similar books and articles
Steven D. Hales (ed.) (2011). A Companion to Relativism. Wiley-Blackwell.
Matthew Talbert (2008). Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535.
John W. Cook (1999). Morality and Cultural Differences. Oxford University Press.
Matthew Talbert (2012). Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest. Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.
Charles Sayward (1988). System Relativism. Ratio 1 (2):163-175.
David Capps, Michael P. Lynch & Daniel Massey (2009). A Coherent Moral Relativism. Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.
Katinka Quintelier & Daniel Fessler (2012). Varying Versions of Moral Relativism: The Philosophy and Psychology of Normative Relativism. Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):95-113.
Torbjörn Tännsjö (2007). Moral Relativism. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):123 - 143.
John Tasioulas (1998). Relativism, Realism, and Reflection. Inquiry 41 (4):377 – 410.
Michael Brady (2010). Disappointment. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):179-198.
Added to index2010-05-27
Total downloads156 ( #25,038 of 1,934,852 )
Recent downloads (6 months)17 ( #33,846 of 1,934,852 )
How can I increase my downloads?