David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):752-770 (2005)
Patients with delusions of control are abnormally aware of the sensory consequences of their actions and have difficulty with on-line corrections of movement. As a result they do not feel in control of their movements. At the same time they are strongly aware of the action being intentional. This leads them to believe that their actions are being controlled by an external agent. In contrast, the normal mark of the self in action is that we have very little experience of it. Most of the time we are not aware of the sensory consequences of our actions or of the various subtle corrections that we make during the course of goal-directed actions. We know that we are agents and that we are successfully causing the world to change. But as actors we move through the world like shadows glimpsed only occasional from the corner of an eye
|Keywords||info:mesh/Movement info:mesh/Proprioception info:mesh/Perceptual Disorders info:mesh/Recognition (Psychology) Humans Perceptual Disorders Delusions Self Concept Awareness Imagination Recognition (Psychology) Visual Perception Proprioception Schizophrenia Schizophrenic Psychology Movement Culture Feedback info:mesh/Imagination info:mesh/Feedback info:mesh/Humans info:mesh/Delusions info:mesh/Awareness info:mesh/Culture info:mesh/Schizophrenic Psychology info:mesh/Schizophrenia info:mesh/Self Concept info:mesh/Visual Perception|
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Citations of this work BETA
Elisabeth Pacherie (2008). The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework. Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
M. Synofzik, G. Vosgerau & A. Newen (2008). Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
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