The self in action: Lessons from delusions of control

Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):752-770 (2005)
Abstract
Patients with delusions of control are abnormally aware of the sensory consequences of their actions and have difficulty with on-line corrections of movement. As a result they do not feel in control of their movements. At the same time they are strongly aware of the action being intentional. This leads them to believe that their actions are being controlled by an external agent. In contrast, the normal mark of the self in action is that we have very little experience of it. Most of the time we are not aware of the sensory consequences of our actions or of the various subtle corrections that we make during the course of goal-directed actions. We know that we are agents and that we are successfully causing the world to change. But as actors we move through the world like shadows glimpsed only occasional from the corner of an eye
Keywords info:mesh/Movement  info:mesh/Proprioception  info:mesh/Perceptual Disorders  info:mesh/Recognition (Psychology)  Humans   Perceptual Disorders   Delusions   Self Concept   Awareness   Imagination   Recognition (Psychology)   Visual Perception   Proprioception   Schizophrenia   Schizophrenic Psychology   Movement   Culture   Feedback  info:mesh/Imagination  info:mesh/Feedback  info:mesh/Humans  info:mesh/Delusions  info:mesh/Awareness  info:mesh/Culture  info:mesh/Schizophrenic Psychology  info:mesh/Schizophrenia  info:mesh/Self Concept  info:mesh/Visual Perception
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Timothy Lane (2012). Toward an Explanatory Framework for Mental Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.

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