The Value of Knowledge and The Test of Time

Abstract
The current literature on the value of knowledge is marred by two unwarranted presumptions, which together distort the debate and conceal what is perhaps the most basic value of knowledge, as distinct from mere true belief. These presumptions are the Synchronic Presumption, which confines philosophical attention to the present snapshot in time; and the Analytical Presumption, which has people look for the value of knowledge in some kind of warrant. Together these presumptions conceal that the value of knowledge might inhere not in a necessary condition, but simply in a property that most knowledge possesses; and, in particular, that it might inhere, as I argue it does, in a certain property of 'resilience': the tendency to survive misleading counter-evidence over time owing to the subject's being in a position to weight it against evidence already possessed
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References found in this work BETA
Jason Baehr (2009). Is There a Value Problem? In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. 42--59.
Ward E. Jones (1997). ``Why Do We Value Knowledge&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 34:423-440.
Martin Kusch (2009). Testimony and the Value of Knowledge. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 60--94.
Plato (1992/2009). Protagoras. Hackett Publishing Company Incorporated.
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