From the Pessimistic Induction to Semantic Antirealism

Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1131-1142 (2011)
Abstract
The Pessimistic Induction (PI) states: most past scientific theories were radically mistaken; therefore, current theories are probably similarly mistaken. But mistaken in what way? On the usual understanding, such past theories are false. However, on widely held views about reference and presupposition, many theoretical claims of previous scientific theories are neither true nor false. And if substantial portions of past theories are truth-valueless, then the PI leads to semantic antirealism. But most current philosophers of science reject semantic antirealism. So PI proponents face a difficult choice: accept either semantic antirealism or an unorthodox position on reference and presupposition.
Keywords pessimistic induction  scientific realism  semantic anti-realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    David Braun (1993). Empty Names. Noûs 27 (4):449-469.
    Keith S. Donnellan (1974). Speaking of Nothing. Philosophical Review 83 (1):3-31.
    Marga Reimer (2001). The Problem of Empty Names. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):491 – 506.

    View all 6 references

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Seungbae Park (2011). A Confutation of the Pessimistic Induction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (1):75-84.
    Michael A. Bishop (2003). The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2012-01-07

    Total downloads

    9 ( #128,855 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.