On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit

Philosophical Review 123 (4):429-484 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two directions of fit are supposed to be determinations of one and the same determinable two-place relation, differing only in the ordering of favored terms. But there is no such determinable because of ineliminable asymmetries between the way that beliefs “aim at truth” and the way that desires “aim at realization.” This essay traces the ills of direction of fit theory to a misunderstanding of Anscombe and proposes a cure that distinguishes theoretical and practical thought by appeal to a distinction between thought in the form of a state and thought in the form of an event.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Direction of Fit.G. F. Schueler - 2013 - In Huge LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell.
Direction of Fit and Motivational Cognitivism.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 235-64.
Changing Direction on Direction of Fit.Alex Gregory - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):603-614.
Wants and desires: A critique of conativist theory of motivation.Chris Meyers - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research:357-370.
Saving the ethical appearances.Michael Ridge - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):633-650.
Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire Revisited.Greg Sherkoske - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):1-11.
Perception of direction is not compensated for neural latency.Bart Krekelberg - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):208-209.
Against representations with two directions of fit.Arto Laitinen - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):179-199.
A causal model for causal priority.Martin Bunzl - 1984 - Erkenntnis 21 (1):31 - 44.
A Note on Essential Indexicals of Direction.Rogério Passos Severo - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):10-15.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-12-14

Downloads
383 (#47,002)

6 months
48 (#76,697)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Trust and Trustworthiness.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):377-394.
Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 40 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 75 references / Add more references