The no‐miracles argument for realism: Inference to an unacceptable explanation

Philosophy of Science 77 (1):35-58 (2010)
I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no‐miracles argument. First, scientists do not accept explanations whose explanans‐statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA. *Received April 2007; revised November 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 300 Pulteney Street, Geneva, NY 14456; e‐mail: gfrost‐
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DOI 10.1086/650207
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Moti Mizrahi (2012). Why the Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism Ultimately Fails. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):132-138.
Moti Mizrahi (2013). The Argument From Underconsideration and Relative Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):393-407.

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