What Mary's Aboutness Is About

Acta Analytica 26 (1):63-74 (2011)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to reinforce anti-physicalism by extending the hard problem to a specific kind of intentional states. For reaching this target, I investigate the mental content of the new intentional states of Jackson’s Mary. I proceed in the following way: I start analyzing the knowledge argument, which highlights the hard problem tied to phenomenal consciousness. In a second step, I investigate a powerful physicalist reply to this argument: the phenomenal concept strategy. In a third step, I propose a constitutional account of phenomenal concepts that captures the Mary scenario adequately, but implies anti-physicalist referents. In a last step, I point at the ramifications constitutional phenomenal concepts have on the constitution of Mary’s new intentional states. Therefore, by focusing the attention on phenomenal concepts, the so-called hard problem of consciousness will be carried over to the alleged easy problem of intentional states as well
Keywords Physicalism  Knowledge argument  Phenomenal concepts  Intentional states  Narrow mental content  Easy problem
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References found in this work BETA
Katalin Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 292--312.
Ned Block (1980). Are Absent Qualia Impossible? Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.
Ned Block (2002). The Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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