David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (3):665-673 (2012)
This paper challenges the claim that science is metaphysically neutral upheld by contenders of the separation of peacefully co-existent science and religion and by evolutionary theists. True, naturalistic metaphysical claims can neither be refuted nor proved and are thus distinct from empirical hypotheses. However, metaphysical assumptions not only regulate the theoretical and empirical study of nature, but are increasingly supported by the growing empirical body of science. This historically evolving interaction has contributed to the development of a naturalistic worldview that renounces the necessity of a transcendent god and of purposeful design. The thesis presented here differs not only from the claims of the “separatists” and of evolutionary theists. In pointing to the metaphysical aspects of science, I also criticize the failure of some evolutionary naturalists to distinguish between empirical and metaphysical contentions. Most important, based on the examination of science suggested here, creationists’ false accusation that science is only a naturalistic dogma is refuted. Finally, the difficulties involved in the position endorsed here for the public support of evolution are acknowledged, taking into account the high religious profile of the American society and the social and political context in the US and in other countries
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References found in this work BETA
Gregory Radick (2003). Is the Theory of Natural Selection Independent of its History. In J. Hodges & Gregory Radick (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Darwin. Cambridge University Press 143--167.
S. Shapin (1982). L'histoire des Sciences Est-Elle Possible. History of Science 20:157-211.
Michael Ruse (2011). Making Room for Faith in an Age of Science: A Response to David Wisdo. Zygon 46 (3):655-672.
Citations of this work BETA
Werner Callebaut (2013). Naturalizing Theorizing: Beyond a Theory of Biological Theories. [REVIEW] Biological Theory 7 (4):413-429.
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