Online research in philosophy

0. Introduction: Mereology, Metaphysics, and Speculative Grammar 0.1 Mereology, Ancient and Contemporary 0.11 Mereology is, strictly speaking, the theory of ...

We can see mereology as a theory of parthood and topology as a theory of wholeness. How can these be combined to obtain a unified theory of parts and wholes? This paper examines various non-equivalent ways of pursuing this task, with specific reference to its relevance to spatio-temporal reasoning. In particular, three main strategies are compared: (i) mereology and topology as two independent (though mutually related) chapters; (ii) mereology as a general theory subsuming topology; (iii) topology as a general theory subsuming mereology. Some more speculative strategies and directions for further research are also considered.

Do mereological fusions have their parts essentially? None of the axioms of non-modal formulations of classical mereology appear to speak directly to this question, and yet a great many philosophers who take the part-whole relation to be governed by these axioms seem to assume they do. Curiously, dissenters tend to depart from non-modal formulations of classical mereology at least when it comes to the uniqueness of composition: no two mereological fusions ever fuse exactly the same objects. I would like to argue that this is more than a remarkable coincidence; there are reasons of principle why one’s adherence to classical mereology should exert some pull towards the hypothesis that fusions have their parts essentially. There is, however, no direct route from non-modal classical mereology to the hypothesis that fusions have their parts essentially, and the reason for this is not merely the expressive limitations of the language of classical mereology; there is no direct route from the combination of classical mereology and propositional modal logic to the hypothesis that fusions have their parts essentially.

Mereology is the logic of part—whole concepts as they are used in many different contexts. The old chemical metaphysics of atoms and molecules seems to fit classical mereology very well. However, when functional attributes are added to part specifications and quantum mechanical considerations are also added, the rules of classical mereology are breached in chemical discourses. A set theoretical alternative mereology is also found wanting. Molecular orbital theory requires a metaphysics of affordances that also stands outside classical mereology.

The Buddhist master Fazang is regarded as one of the greatest metaphysicians in medieval Asia.

This paper elaborates upon various responses to the Problem of the One over the Many, in the service of two central goals. The first is to situate Huayan's mereology within the context of Buddhism's historical development, showing its continuity with a broader tradition of philosophizing about part-whole relations. The second goal is to highlight the way in which Huayan's mereology combines the virtues of the Nyāya-Vaisheshika and Indian Buddhist solutions to the Problem of the One over the Many while avoiding their vices.

This is an attempt to explain, in a way familiar to contemporary ways of thinking about mereology, why someone might accept some prima facie puzzling remarks by Fazang, such as his claims that the eye of a lion is its ear and that a rafter of a building is identical to the building itself. These claims are corollaries of the Huayan Buddhist thesis that everything is part of everything else, and it is intended here to show that there is a rational basis for this thesis that involves a nonstandard notion of parthood and, importantly, that does not violate the principle of noncontradiction.