Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation [Book Review]

Abstract
Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of social understanding as an ongoing, dynamical process of participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. This process may be described (1) from a dynamical agentive systems point of view as an interaction and coordination of two embodied agents; (2) from a phenomenological approach as a mutual incorporation, i.e. a process in which the lived bodies of both participants extend and form a common intercorporality. Intersubjectivity, it is argued, is not a solitary task of deciphering or simulating the movements of others but means entering a process of embodied interaction and generating common meaning through it. This approach will be further illustrated by an analysis of primary dyadic interaction in early childhood
Keywords Coordination  Enaction  Infancy  Intercorporality  Intersubjectivity  Participatory sense-making  Phenomenology  Social interaction
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2007). Participatory Sense-Making. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
    Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (2005). Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):429-452.

    View all 30 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Stephen Langfur (2013). The You-I Event: On the Genesis of Self-Awareness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):769-790.

    View all 20 citations

    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-07-18

    Total downloads

    62 ( #20,235 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    3 ( #30,953 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.