David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2) (1993)
Until recently there has been little contact between the mind-brain debate in philosophy and the debate in psychiatry about the nature of mental illness. In this paper some of the analogies and disanalogies between the two debates are explored. It is noted in particular that the emphasis in modern philosophy of mind on the importance of the concept of action has been matched by a recent shift in the debate about mental illness from analyses of disease in terms of failure of functioning to analyses of illness in terms of failure of action. The concept of action thus provides a natural conduit for two-way exchanges of ideas between philosophy and psychiatry. The potential fruitfulness of such exchanges is illustrated with an outline of the mutual heuristic significance of psychiatric work on delusions and philosophical accounts of Intentionality.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Soren Holm (1998). Mind, Body, and Mental Illness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (4):337-341.
Derek Bolton (1996). Mind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder: The Nature of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
George Graham (2010). The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness. Routledge.
K. William M. Fulford (1994). Value, Illness, and Failure of Action: Framework for a Philosophical Psychopathology of Delusions. In George Graham & Lester D. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
Martin Roth (1986). The Reality of Mental Illness. Cambridge University Press.
Carl Elliott (2004). Mental Illness and its Limits. In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
S. Nassir Ghaemi (1999). An Empirical Approach to Understanding Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):21-24.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads78 ( #19,885 of 1,140,344 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #85,215 of 1,140,344 )
How can I increase my downloads?