On regulating what is known: A way to social epistemology

Synthese 73 (1):145 - 183 (1987)
Abstract
This paper lays the groundwork for normative-yet-naturalistic social epistemology. I start by presenting two scenarios for the history of epistemology since Kant, one in which social epistemology is the natural outcome and the other in which it represents a not entirely satisfactory break with classical theories of knowledge. Next I argue that the current trend toward naturalizing epistemology threatens to destroy the distinctiveness of the sociological approach by presuming that it complements standard psychological and historical approaches. I then try to reassert, in Comtean fashion, the epistemologist's credentials in regulating knowledge production. Finally, I consider how social epistemology may have something exciting and relevant to say about contemporary debates in the theory of knowledge.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Richard Boyd (1984). Scientific Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 21 (1&2):767-791.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Mart Fehér (1990). The Role Accorded to the Public by Philosophers of Science1. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):229-240.
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