Referentiality in Frege and Heidegger

Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (1):37-52 (2005)
determines reference has been attributed to both Frege and Heidegger. Contrary to the view that this commits them to linguistic idealism, I defend a weak version of the determination thesis according to which both Fregean and Heideggerian reference allow for the possibility of error and for the objectivity of discourse. Thus, what we refer to is accessible to us only by our grasping its sense of meaning; sense is a way of fixing reference, but does not constitute the referent as what it is. Key Words: Frege • Heidegger • reference.
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DOI 10.1177/0191453705048318
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