Do the self-deceived get what they want?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312 (2005)
Abstract Two of the most basic questions regarding self-deception remain unsettled: What do self-deceivers want? What do self-deceivers get? I argue that self-deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe. However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele’s account of self-deception, I argue that self-deceivers do not satisfy this desire. Instead, the end-state of self-deception is a false higher-order belief. This shows all self-deception to be a failure of self-knowledge.
Keywords Belief  Desire  Epistemology  Motivation  Self-deception
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    Kent Bach (1988). Critical Notice. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
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