Theoria 10 (2):49-78 (1995)
|Abstract||There are several areas in logic where the monotonicity of the consequence relation fails to hold. Roughly these are the traditional non-monotonic systems arising in Artificial Intelligence (such as defeasible logics, circumscription, defaults, ete), numerical non-monotonic systems (probabilistic systems, fuzzy logics, belief functions), resource logics (also called substructural logics such as relevance logic, linear logic, Lambek calculus), and the logic of theory change (also called belief revision, see Alchourron, Gärdenfors, Makinson ). We are seeking a common axiomatic and semantical approach to the notion of consequence whieh can be specialised to any of the above areas. This paper introduces the notions of structured consequence relation, shift operators and structural connectives, and shows an intrinsic connection between the above areas|
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