David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations (2002)
We outline the rationale and preliminary results of using the State Context Property (SCOP) formalism, originally developed as a generalization of quantum mechanics, to describe the contextual manner in which concepts are evoked, used, and combined to generate meaning. The quantum formalism was developed to cope with problems arising in the description of (1) the measurement process, and (2) the generation of new states with new properties when particles become entangled. Similar problems arising with concepts motivated the formal treatment introduced here. Concepts are viewed not as fixed representations, but entities existing in states of potentiality that require interaction with a context---a stimulus or another concept---to `collapse' to observable form as an exemplar, prototype, or other (possibly imaginary) instance. The stimulus situation plays the role of the measurement in physics, acting as context that induces a change of the cognitive state from superposition state to collapsed state. The collapsed state is more likely to consist of a conjunction of concepts for associative than analytic thought because more stimulus or concept properties take part in the collapse. We provide two contextual measures of conceptual distance---one using collapse probabilities and the other weighted properties---and show how they can be applied to conjunctions using the pet fish problem.
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Zheng Wang, Jerome R. Busemeyer, Harald Atmanspacher & Emmanuel M. Pothos (2013). The Potential of Using Quantum Theory to Build Models of Cognition. Topics in Cognitive Science 5 (4):672-688.
Diederik Aerts, Liane Gabora & Sandro Sozzo (2013). Concepts and Their Dynamics: A Quantum‐Theoretic Modeling of Human Thought. Topics in Cognitive Science 5 (4):737-772.
Peter D. Bruza, Zheng Wang & Jerome R. Busemeyer (2015). Quantum Cognition: A New Theoretical Approach to Psychology. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (7):383-393.
Diederik Aerts (2009). Quantum Particles as Conceptual Entities: A Possible Explanatory Framework for Quantum Theory. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 14 (4):361-411.
Patricia Rich (forthcoming). Comparing the Axiomatic and Ecological Approaches to Rationality: Fundamental Agreement Theorems in SCOP. Synthese:1-19.
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