Properties and universals
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
A famous proposed solution to the one over many problem is found in Plato. For example, it appears in The Parmenedies and is introduce by Zeno arguing that . . . if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like-is that your position? and Socrates responds: do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself, and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate-things which participate in likeness become in that degree and manner like; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation? Where is the wonder? and the discussion moves on to the interesting question that..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2000). What is the Problem of Universals? Mind 109 (434):255-273.
Paweł Rojek (2008). Three Trope Theories. Axiomathes 18 (3):359-377.
Dominic McIver Lopes (2003). The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency. Mind 112 (447):434--48.
Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Clarendon Press.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford University Press.
Kristie Miller (2008). Thing and Object. Acta Analytica 23 (1):69-89.
Jiri Benovsky (2009). On (Not) Being in Two Places at the Same Time: An Argument Against Endurantism. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):239 - 248.
Added to index2009-02-15
Total downloads31 ( #57,204 of 1,102,739 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #296,833 of 1,102,739 )
How can I increase my downloads?