David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Logica 88 (1):85 - 112 (2008)
Formal nonmonotonic systems try to model the phenomenon that common sense reasoners are able to “jump” in their reasoning from assumptions Δ to conclusions C without their being any deductive chain from Δ to C. Such jumps are done by various mechanisms which are strongly dependent on context and knowledge of how the actual world functions. Our aim is to motivate these jump rules as inference rules designed to optimise survival in an environment with scant resources of effort and time. We begin with a general discussion and quickly move to Section 3 where we introduce five resource principles. We show that these principles lead to some well known nonmonotonic systems such as Nute’s defeasible logic. We also give several examples of practical reasoning situations to illustrate our principles.
|Keywords||Philosophy Computational Linguistics Mathematical Logic and Foundations Logic|
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Citations of this work BETA
Dov M. Gabbay & Artur S. D'Avila Garcez (2009). Logical Modes of Attack in Argumentation Networks. Studia Logica 93 (2-3):199-230.
Dov M. Gabbay & Artur S. D’Avila Garcez (2009). Logical Modes of Attack in Argumentation Networks. Studia Logica 93 (2/3):199 - 230.
Patrick Allo (2016). Logic, Reasoning and Revision. Theoria 82 (1):3-31.
M. Abraham, Dov M. Gabbay & U. Schild (2009). Analysis of the Talmudic Argumentum a Fortiori Inference Rule (Kal Vachomer) Using Matrix Abduction. Studia Logica 92 (3):281 - 364.
Rineke Verbrugge (2009). Logic and Social Cognition. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (6):649 - 680.
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