In defence of qualia-epiphenomenalism

Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114 (2006)
Abstract
Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.
Keywords Dualism  Epiphenomenalism  Epistemology  Interactionism  Physicalism  Properties  Qualia
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