Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114 (2006)
|Abstract||Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.|
|Keywords||Dualism Epiphenomenalism Epistemology Interactionism Physicalism Properties Qualia|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Terence E. Horgan (1987). Supervenient Qualia. Philosophical Review 96 (October):491-520.
Ausonio Marras (1993). Materialism, Functionalism, and Supervenient Qualia. Dialogue 32 (3):475-92.
William E. Seager (1983). Functionalism, Qualia and Causation. Mind 92 (April):174-88.
Michael Watkins (1989). The Knowledge Argument Against the Knowledge Argument. Analysis 49 (June):158-60.
Rex Welshon (1999). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
Amir Horowitz (1999). Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Hans Muller (2009). More Troubles for Epiphenomenalism. Philosophia 37 (1):109-112.
Alexander Staudacher (2006). Epistemological Challenges to Qualia-Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):153-175.
Fredrik Stjernberg, Not so Epiphenomenal Qualia. Spinning Ideas.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads94 ( #7,012 of 549,017 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #7,681 of 549,017 )
How can I increase my downloads?