L’irréductibilité de la connaissance et l’intentionnalité en contexte de découverte abductive

Laval Théologique et Philosophique 67 (2):227-258 (2011)
Abstract
Knowledge is still an enigma, with its ability to inductively bring out a pattern without restricting itself to an empirical count of situations experienced. Instead of seeing the concept as a weakened object representing an external reality, it is suggested to view knowledge as the bridging of a distance with an ability for the knower to stay connected with outward reality. Attempts at defining an external and quantitative criterion of truth are questioned, as many human performances are not likely to be solved or even properly grasped by the project of artificial intelligence. The positive side of the cognitive constructivist project is finally assessed and it is argued that one of its unexpected results could be to reinsert the human knowing power in the sub-human realm.
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PhilPapers Archive Philippe Gagnon, L’irréductibilité de la connaissance et l’intentionnalité en contexte de découverte abductive
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