|Abstract||This short sketch of Gödel’s incompleteness proof shows how it arises naturally from Cantor’s diagonalization method . It renders Gödel’s proof and its relation to the semantic paradoxes transparent. Some historical details, which are often ignored, are pointed out. We also make some observations on circularity and draw brief comparisons with natural language. The sketch does not include the messy details of the arithmetization of the language, but the motives for it are made obvious. We suggest this as a more efficient way to teach the topic than what is found in the standard textbooks. For the sake of self–containment Cantor’s original diagonalization is included. A broader and more technical perspective on diagonalization is given in [Gaifman 2005]. In  Cantor presented a new type of argument that shows that the set of all binary sequences (sequences of the form a0, a1,…,an,…, where each ai is either 0 or 1) is not denumerable ─ that is, cannot be arranged in a sequence, where the index ranges over the natural numbers. Let A0, A2,…An, … be a sequence of binary sequences. Say An = an,0, an,1, …, an,i, … . Define a new sequence A* = b0, b1,…,bn,… , by putting|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Francesco Berto (2009). There's Something About Gödel: The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem. Wiley-Blackwell.
Zofia Adamowicz & Teresa Bigorajska (2001). Existentially Closed Structures and Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (1):349-356.
Roman Murawski (1997). Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems and Computer Science. Foundations of Science 2 (1):123-135.
John Bell (2007). Incompleteness in a General Setting. The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13 (1):21 - 30.
Panu Raatikainen (2005). On the Philosophical Relevance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
Added to index2010-08-14
Total downloads38 ( #30,802 of 548,976 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,976 )
How can I increase my downloads?