David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The semantic paradoxes, whose paradigm is the Liar, played a crucial role at a crucial juncture in the development of modern logic. In his 1908 seminal paper, Russell outlined a system, soon to become that of the Principia Mathematicae, whose main goal was the solution of the logical paradoxes, both semantic and settheoretic. Russell did not distinguish between the two and his theory of types was designed to solve both kinds in the same uniform way. Set theoreticians, however, were content to treat only the set-theoretic paradoxes, putting aside the semantic ones as a non-mathematical concern. This separation was explicitly proposed, eighteen years after Russell’s paper, by Ramsey, though he, like Russell, advocated a system that addresses both kinds. Since then, the semantic paradoxes have been viewed within the perspective of the theory of truth, where they have occupied a respectable niche, but one of rather specialized interest.
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Michał Walicki (2009). Reference, Paradoxes and Truth. Synthese 171 (1):195 - 226.
Lionel Shapiro (2006). The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):477 - 515.
Miroslav Hanke (2014). Semantic Paradox: A Comparative Analysis of Scholastic and Analytic Views. Res Philosophica 91 (3):367-386.
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