David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 89 (5):223-261 (1992)
If we try to evaluate the sentence on line 1 we ¯nd ourselves going in an unending cycle. For this reason alone we may conclude that the sentence is not true. Moreover we are driven to this conclusion by an elementary argument: If the sentence is true then what it asserts is true, but what it asserts is that the sentence on line 1 is not true. Consequently the sentence on line 1 is not true. But when we write this true conclusion on line 2 we ¯nd ourselves repeating the very same sentence. It seems that we are unable to deny the truth of the sentence on line 1 without asserting it at the same time.
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Haim Gaifman (2010). Vagueness, Tolerance and Contextual Logic. Synthese 174 (1):5 - 46.
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Stefan Wintein (2012). On the Behavior of True and False. Minds and Machines 22 (1):1-24.
George Bealer (1994). Property Theory: The Type-Free Approachv. The Church Approach. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (2):139 - 171.
Michał Walicki (2009). Reference, Paradoxes and Truth. Synthese 171 (1):195 - 226.
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