David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 140 (1-2):97 - 119 (2004)
There are three sections in this paper. The ﬁrst is a philosophical discussion of the general problem of reasoning under limited deductive capacity. The second sketches a rigorous way of assigning probabilities to statements in pure arithmetic; motivated by the preceding discussion, it can nonetheless be read separately. The third is a philosophical discussion that highlights the shifting contextual character of subjective probabilities and beliefs.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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Citations of this work BETA
Kenny Easwaran (2015). Dr. Truthlove Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities. Noûs 49 (4).
Thomas Icard (forthcoming). Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-41.
Kenny Easwaran (2011). Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):321-332.
Kenny Easwaran (2009). Probabilistic Proofs and Transferability. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (3):341-362.
Rohit Parikh (2008). Sentences, Belief and Logical Omniscience, or What Does Deduction Tell Us? Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):459-476.
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