Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 140 (1-2):97 - 119 (2004)
|Abstract||There are three sections in this paper. The ﬁrst is a philosophical discussion of the general problem of reasoning under limited deductive capacity. The second sketches a rigorous way of assigning probabilities to statements in pure arithmetic; motivated by the preceding discussion, it can nonetheless be read separately. The third is a philosophical discussion that highlights the shifting contextual character of subjective probabilities and beliefs.|
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