Self-reference and the acyclicity of rational choice

Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3):117-140 (1999)
Self-reference in semantics, which leads to well-known paradoxes, is a thoroughly researched subject. The phenomenon can appear also in decision theoretic situations. There is a structural analogy between the two and, more interestingly, an analogy between principles concerning truth and those concerning rationality. The former can serve as a guide for clarifying the latter. Both the analogies and the disanalogies are illuminating
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