Anti-realism in the philosophy of probability: Bruno de finetti's subjectivism [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):239--261 (1989)
Known as an upholder of subjectivism, Bruno de finetti (1906-1985) put forward a totally original philosophy of probability. This can be qualified as a combination of empiricism and pragmatism within an entirely coherent antirealistic perspective. The paper aims at clarifying the central features of such a philosophical position, Which is not only incompatible with any perspective based on an objective notion, But cannot be assimilated to other subjective views of probability either
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    Rudolf Carnap (1952). The Continuum of Inductive Methods. [Chicago]University of Chicago Press.

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