David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351 – 369 (2008)
I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non-representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self-organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub-personal level is superior. I further recommend a scientific pragmatism regarding the concept of representation.
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Citations of this work BETA
Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith & Frédérique Vignemont (2012). Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):1-13.
Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.
Liesbet Quaeghebeur & Peter Reynaert (2010). Does the Need for Linguistic Expression Constitute a Problem to Be Solved? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):15-36.
Marco Mirolli (2012). Representations in Dynamical Embodied Agents: Re-Analyzing a Minimally Cognitive Model Agent. Cognitive Science 36 (5):870-895.
Jonathan S. Spackman & Stephen C. Yanchar (2014). Embodied Cognition, Representationalism, and Mechanism: A Review and Analysis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 44 (1):46-79.
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