Consciousness and free will

Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39 (1):7-16 (2004)
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Abstract

I argue against epiphenomenalist views that consciousness is part of and has an effect on the system in which action is generated. Those who deny free will based on recent results in neuroscience are looking for it at the wrong level of explanation. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider.

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Shaun Gallagher
University of Memphis

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