Comments on the will to believe
Social Epistemology 20 (1):35 – 39 (2006)
| Abstract | Kasher and Nishi interpret James as holding an expressivist theory about epistemic duties, as well as other normative sentences. On this interpretation, James's claim that we have a will-to-believe type option to believe an epistemic duty winds up being inconsistent. For one can believe only that which is either true or false; but, for the expressivist, normative claims are neither. It is argued that Feldman's essay is not only a wildly anachronistic account of Clifford and James but also is of no philosophical merit in its own right. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJames Dreier (2002). The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):136–143.
Mark Schroeder (2010). How to Be an Expressivist About Truth. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
Mark Schroeder (2008). Expression for Expressivists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):86–116.
Wim de Muijnck (2011). Normative Authority for Empirical Science. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):263-275.
Mark Andrew Schroeder (2008). Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford University Press.
Chase B. Wrenn (2007). Why There Are No Epistemic Duties. Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (01):115-136.
Michael Pendlebury (2010). How to Be a Normative Expressivist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):182-207.
James Dreier (1999). Transforming Expressivism. Noûs 33 (4):558-572.
Joshua D. Crabill (2013). Suppose Yalcin is Wrong About Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):625-635.
Jeff Kasser & Nishi Shah (2006). The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of "the Will to Believe". Social Epistemology 20 (1):1 – 17.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads18 ( #67,622 of 549,546 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,546 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
