Experimenting with phenomenology

Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):119-134 (2006)
Abstract
We review the use of introspective and phenomenological methods in experimental settings. We distinguish different senses of introspection, and further distinguish phenomenological method from introspectionist approaches. Two ways of using phenomenology in experimental procedures are identified: first, the neurophenomenological method, proposed by Varela, involves the training of experimental subjects. This approach has been directly and productively incorporated into the protocol of experiments on perception. A second approach may have wider application and does not involve training experimental subjects in phenomenological method. It requires front-loading phenomenological insights into experimental design. A number of experiments employing this approach are reviewed. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for both the cognitive sciences and phenomenology. Ó 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc
Keywords *Cognitive Science  *Experimental Design  *Experimental Subjects  *Introspection  *Phenomenology  Perception
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Closing the Gap: Some Questions for Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.

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Citations of this work BETA
Elizabeth Irvine (2012). Old Problems with New Measures in the Science of Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):627-648.
Marc Champagne (2013). Can “I” Prevent You From Entering My Mind? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.

View all 9 citations

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