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- Maria Carla Galavotti (2003). Harold Jeffreys' Probabilistic Epistemology: Between Logicism and Subjectivism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):43-57.Harold Jeffreys' ideas on the interpretation of probability and epistemology are reviewed. It is argued that with regard to the interpretation of probability, Jeffreys embraces a version of logicism that shares some features of the subjectivism of Ramsey and de Finetti. Jeffreys also developed a probabilistic epistemology, characterized by a pragmatical and constructivist attitude towards notions such as ‘objectivity’, ‘reality’ and ‘causality’. 1 Introductory remarks 2 The interpretation of probability 3 Jeffreys' probabilistic epistemology.
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It is argued that models of H. Jeffreys' axioms of probability (Jeffreys [1939] 1967) are not monotone even with I. J. Good's proposed modification (Good 1950). Hence the additivity axiom seems essential to a theory of probability as it is with Kolmogorov's system (Kolmogorov 1950).
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