Kordig's paradox objection to radical meaning variance theories
Philosophy of Science 50 (3):494-497 (1983)
| Abstract | In his book, The Justification of Scientific Change, Carl Kordig claims that the radical meaning variance view of Feyerabend and others becomes ensnared in a self-referential paradox. The accusation fails because it rests upon a confusion of that view with its "counterparts" in other linguistic/theoretical contexts | |||||||||
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Jonas Åkerman & Patrick Greenough (2010). Hold the Context Fixed, Vagueness Still Remains. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Oxford University Press.
Richard Breheny (2002). The Current State of (Radical) Pragmatics in the Cognitive Sciences. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):169–187.
Carl R. Kordig (1971). Scientific Transitions, Meaning Invariance, and Derivability. Southern Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):119-125.
Jerzy Giedymin (1970). The Paradox of Meaning Variance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):257-268.
Carl R. Kordig (1969). Another Ethical Paradox. Mind 78 (312):598-599.
Howard Sankey (2000). The Language of Science: Meaning Variance and Theory Comparison. Language Sciences 22 (2):117-136.
Ole Thomassen Hjortland (forthcoming). Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
Carl R. Kordig (1971). The Comparability of Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science 38 (4):467-485.
Carl R. Kordig (1970). Feyerabend and Radical Meaning Variance. Noûs 4 (4):399-404.
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