Graduate studies at Western
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
|Abstract||On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects or reflectively introspects one's experiences, or in the instant of self-recognition of one's image in the mirror, or in the proper use of the first-person pronoun, or in the construction of a self-narrative. Rather, these different kinds of self-consciousness are to be distinguished from the pre-reflective self-consciousness which is present whenever I am living through or undergoing an experience, i.e., whenever I am consciously perceiving the world, whenever I am thinking an occurrent thought, whenever I am feeling sad or happy, thirsty or in pain, and so forth|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert Arp (2007). Consciousness and Awareness - Switched-on Rheostats: A Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):101-106.
Dan Zahavi (2006). Thinking About (Self-)Consciousness: Phenomenological Perspectives. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
Georg Northoff (2007). Subcortical Regions and the Self. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):100-101.
Eduard Marbach (2007). No Heterophenomenology Without Autophenomenology: Variations on a Theme of Mine. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):75-87.
Dorothée Legrand & Susanne Ravn (2009). Perceiving Subjectivity in Bodily Movement: The Case of Dancers. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):389-408.
Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (2007). Phenomenology. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.
Joseph K. Schear (2009). Experience and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):95 - 105.
Shaun Gallagher (2007). Phenomenological Approaches to Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads96 ( #8,536 of 739,345 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,545 of 739,345 )
How can I increase my downloads?