David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21 (2000)
Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is good evidence to suggest that although certain aspects of the minimal self are primitive and embodied, other aspects may be accessed only in reflective consciousness. Employing a modified concept of the minimal self, it may be possible to construct a robotic form of non-conscious self-reference that depends on an interaction between the robotic body and its environment. In contrast to the minimal self, the narrative self involves continuity over time and is directly relevant to discussions of memory and personal identity. There is growing consensus among philosophers and cognitive scientists about the importance of narrative and its relation to episodic memory and left-hemisphere functions. There are, however, at least two different views of how the narrative self is structured. On one model it is nothing more than an abstract point. On a more extended view, proposed here, the self is a rich amalgam of narratives that allows for the equivocations, contradictions, and self-deceptions of personal life. Even in this case, however, neurocognitive models contribute to our understanding of how narrative identity is structured.
|Keywords||Agency Narrative Ownership Schizophrenia Self Self-consciousness|
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M. Synofzik, G. Vosgerau & A. Newen (2008). Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
Atsushi Sato & Asako Yasuda (2005). Illusion of Sense of Self-Agency: Discrepancy Between the Predicted and Actual Sensory Consequences of Actions Modulates the Sense of Self-Agency, but Not the Sense of Self-Ownership. Cognition 94 (3):241-255.
Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen (2008). I Move, Therefore I Am: A New Theoretical Framework to Investigate Agency and Ownership. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):411 - 424.
M. Tsakiris, G. Prabhu & P. Haggard (2006). Having a Body Versus Moving Your Body: How Agency Structures Body-Ownership. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):423-432.
Matthew R. Longo, Friederike Schüür, Marjolein P. M. Kammers, Manos Tsakiris & Patrick Haggard (2008). What is Embodiment? A Psychometric Approach. Cognition 107 (3):978-998.
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